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Uncertainty plus prior equals rational bias: An intuitive Bayesian probability weighting function
Psychological Review 119 (4):878-887 (2012)
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Citations of this work
How (in)variant are subjective representations of described and experienced risk and rewards?David Kellen, Thorsten Pachur & Ralph Hertwig - 2016 - Cognition 157 (C):126-138.
Judgment errors in naturalistic numerical estimation.Wanling Zou & Sudeep Bhatia - 2021 - Cognition 211 (C):104647.
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