Abstract

The thesis is comprised of three separate papers, each of which addresses an area of philosophical problems in psychoanalysis. The first paper deals with the issues of progress and the mechanism of theoretical change by examining Heinz Kohut's case of "The Two Analyses of Mr. Z." I discuss these issues in terms of Kuhn's paradigm concept and Laudan's concept of science as a problem solving activity, and argue that the paradigm concept is a useful one for conceptualizing major movements in science, but that Laudan's ideas offer a better explanation for the mechanism of scientific change. ;The second paper is a critique of Adolf Grunbaum's views on psychoanalysis. I argue that the experimental studies Grunbaum uses to demonstrate the therapeutic inefficacy of psychoanalysis are conceptually ill founded; in particular, the concept of the spontaneous remission rate for symptoms cannot serve as a baseline for evaluating treatments of any chronic illness, mental disturbances in particular. Grunbaum's focus on Freud, while neglecting contemporary innovations and reformulations of Freud's ideas, renders his critique too narrow and somewhat anachronistic. ;The final paper deals with empathy and the role it can play in a scientific psychology. The first four sections characterize the concept of empathy and set it in its historical and philosophical context. The remaining parts deal with how empathy can be used in a scientific psychology, its validation, and the character of the science which results from its use. The most important implication is that theoretical confirmation in any psychology using introspection and empathy will be dependent to a much greater extent on the conceptual framework, personal values, and social interests of the researcher than is the case in the physical sciences