A revenge-immune solution to the semantic paradoxes

Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (2):139-177 (2003)
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Abstract

The paper offers a solution to the semantic paradoxes, one in which (1) we keep the unrestricted truth schema “True(A)↔A”, and (2) the object language can include its own metalanguage. Because of the first feature, classical logic must be restricted, but full classical reasoning applies in “ordinary” contexts, including standard set theory. The more general logic that replaces classical logic includes a principle of substitutivity of equivalents, which with the truth schema leads to the general intersubstitutivity of True(A) with A within the language.The logic is also shown to have the resources required to represent the way in which sentences (like the Liar sentence and the Curry sentence) that lead to paradox in classical logic are “defective”. We can in fact define a hierarchy of “defectiveness” predicates within the language. Contrary to claims that any solution to the paradoxes just breeds further paradoxes (“revenge problems”) involving defectiveness predicates, there is a general consistency/conservativeness proof that shows that talk of truth and the various “levels of defectiveness” can all be made coherent together within a single object language.

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Citations of this work

Logical Partisanhood.Jack Woods - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1203-1224.
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Axiomatic theories of truth.Volker Halbach - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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No fact of the matter.Hartry Field - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):457 – 480.

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References found in this work

Outline of a theory of truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
The Logic of Provability.George Boolos - 1993 - Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

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