Vagueness, partial belief, and logic

Abstract

Discussion of Chapter 5 of Stephen Schiffer's "The Things We Mean' in which Stephen Schiffer advances two novel theses: 1. Vagueness (and indeterminacy more generally) is a psychological phenomenon; 2. It is indeterminate whether classical logic applies in situations where vagueness matters.

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original Field, Hartry (2016) "Vagueness, Partial Belief, and Logic". In Ostertag, Gary, Meanings and Other Things: Themes From the Work of Stephen Schiffer, pp. : Oxford University Press (2016)

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Citations of this work

Formal Representations of Belief.Franz Huber - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Vagueness and Ambivalence.Barry Lam - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (3):359-379.

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