Heidegger’s Relational Ontology

Maynooth Philosophical Papers 11:35-53 (2022)
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Abstract

The understanding of Being in terms of substance has given rise to many philosophical problems, the most obvious and persistent of which is subject/object dualism. Heidegger recognises the problems substance ontology has created and rejects the ontological primacy of the subject. In doing so, he discovers an alternate ontological understanding, one that ultimately constitutes a return to a Neoplatonic ontology in which Being is understood in terms of relation. Heidegger’s ontology is, therefore, a recovery of this Neoplatonic relational ontology.

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