Abstract

Throughout his writings, Chisholm has maintained that the concept of intentionality provides a basis for an ontological distinction between the mental and the physical. This dissertation gives a comprehensive presentation and critical examination of this claim. Chisholm has often identified this 'Intentionalist Thesis' as a linguistic version of Brentano's view that intentional inexistence provides a distinction between mental and physical phenomena. The introductory chapter places Chisholm's work in this historical context, suggesting an interpretation of Brentano's view contrary to much of the tradition. In addition, the chapter considers complexities introduced by the concept of 'inner consciousness', and raises objections to the Brentanist view. ;The next two chapters consider Chisholm's numerous attempts to formulate adequate criteria of the intentional use of language. It is maintained that no adequate criteria have yet to be proposed, and that certain problems afflict the overall strategy Chisholm employs. Lacking criteria, the claim to offer a linguistic version of Brentano's thesis is weakened, and the alleged advantages of a "logical mark of the psychological" are lost. ;The last two chapters consider a Chisholmian's ability to deal with various strategies aimed at denying the significance of the Intentionalist Thesis as a basis for a mental-physical dichotomy. The fourth chapter takes this question up with respect to attempts to translate intentional sentences into nonintentional sentences , and arguments that the nontranslatability of intentional sentences lacks ontological significance because there are nonpsychological entities requiring intentional descriptions . In the final chapter additional ontological commitments are considered as resources for a Chisholmian response to contingent identity theorists. The attempt to avoid this challenge fails because the reduction of events to states of affairs is mistaken. ;Overall, the dissertation argues that Chisholm has not provided adequate criteria of intentionality, and that, though not all of the challenges to the Intentionalist Thesis pose serious threats, approaches which emphasize identity of events despite logical distinctness have yet to be shown to be ineffective against Chisholm's approach.