Truthmaking and the is—ought gap

Synthese 198 (2):887-914 (2018)
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Abstract

This paper is an attempt to apply the truthmaker approach, recently developed by a number of authors, to the problem of providing an adequate formulation of the is–ought gap. I begin by setting up the problem and criticizing some other accounts of how the problem should be stated; I then introduce the basic apparatus of truth-making and show how it may be extended to include both descriptive and normative truth-makers; I next consider how the gap principle should be formulated, attempting to deal as systematically as possible with the ‘harmless’ counter-examples; I also consider the relationship between the gap principle and various other doctrines concerning the separation between the normative and descriptive realms; and I conclude this part of the paper with some general remarks in favor of adopting the truth-maker approach over some of the alternative approaches. The paper concludes with a formal appendix, which gives precise expression to some of claims made in the previous informal part of the paper.

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Kit Fine
New York University

Citations of this work

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A Puzzle for Social Essences.Michael J. Raven - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (1):128-148.
Metaethical Experientialism.Andrew Y. Lee - forthcoming - In Geoffrey Lee & Adam Pautz, The Importance of Being Conscious. Oxford University Press.
The Laws of Thought and the Laws of Truth as Two Sides of One Coin.Ulf Hlobil - 2022 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 52 (1):313-343.
The bases of truths.Michael J. Raven - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (7):2153-2174.

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References found in this work

Aboutness.Stephen Yablo - 2014 - Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2003 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2004 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 66 (2):381-381.
How to derive "ought" from "is".John R. Searle - 1964 - Philosophical Review 73 (1):43-58.
Modality and Tense: Philosophical Papers.Kit Fine - 2005 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

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