Abstract
This paper will investigate Aristotle’s methodology in the
Nicomachean Ethics [EN]. It is widely agreed that Aristotle’s
explicit account of his methodology in EN is the method of
dialectic. However, it has been argued that Aristotle does not
consistently practice this method and often appeals to
metaphysical principles in his other texts to construct his moral
theory. As a result, it has been claimed that Aristotle not only
diverges from his dialectical method, but also contradicts his
doctrine of the autonomy of distinct branches of philosophical
enquiry.
In this paper, I will investigate what it would mean for
Aristotle’s account to be dialectical and will show that, although
Aristotle’s explicit methodology is dialectical he nonetheless
diverges from this method in presenting his ergon argument.
However, though he diverges from his dialectical method, I will
argue that we can understand this divergence as a response to
the definitive problem of EN; namely, how can we actually
achieve the highest good in our actions. Thus, I will conclude
that although Aristotle does in fact diverge from his dialectical
method, we can understand this divergence as consistent with
the claim that EN is an autonomous enquiry.