David Lewis on Ways Things Might Be: An Examination of Modal Realism through Lewis’s Correspondence

Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80 (4):1059-1080 (2024)
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Abstract

David Lewis is widely known for maintaining the bizarre thesis known as genuine modal realism (hereafter, modal realism). He argued for modal realism on grounds of serviceability in On the Plurality of Worlds. However, earlier in Counterfactuals, he proposed a different kind of argument: from talk of ways things might be to possible worlds. In this paper, I examine the evolution of the latter argument in Lewis’s thought and evaluate its place in his overall case for modal realism, especially in light of the alternative theory of modality known as magical ersatzism. I argue that Lewis turns the argument on its head in his critique of magical ersatzism, but that his later commitment to Ramseyan humility subjects him to a similar criticism. Therefore, the argument is, ultimately, a poisoned pawn for Lewis.

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A. R. J. Fisher
Gonzaga University

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References found in this work

Attitudes de dicto and de se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.
New Work For a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1997 - In David Hugh Mellor & Alex Oliver, Properties. New York: Oxford University Press.
The Paradoxes of Time Travel.David Lewis - 1976 - American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (2):145-152.
How to define theoretical terms.David Lewis - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (13):427-446.
Convention: A Philosophical Study.David K. Lewis - 1971 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 4 (2):137-138.

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