Might Teaching be Judgement Dependent?

Philosophia 48 (2):777-787 (2020)
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Abstract

Our thesis in this paper is that consideration of Wright’s account of what it is to be judgement-dependent leads us to the conclusion that teaching is judgement dependent. We begin with a consideration of Wright’s account of what it is to be judgement-dependent. We then make the case that teaching satisfies the conditions on what it is to be judgement-dependent. Our intention is not to delve into the independent plausibility of such a view. Our focus is simply on showing the connection between Wright’s account of judgement-dependence and what it is to teach.

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Author Profiles

Andrew Fisher
Nottingham University
Jonathan Tallant
Nottingham University

Citations of this work

Teaching and knowledge: uneasy bedfellows.Andrew Fisher & Jonathan Tallant - 2024 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 58 (1):24-40.

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References found in this work

Truth and objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Dispositional Theories of Value.Michael Smith, David Lewis & Mark Johnston - 1989 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 63 (1):89-174.
Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):883-890.
Realism and response-dependence.Philip Pettit - 1991 - Mind 100 (4):587-626.
Objectivity refigured: Pragmatism without verificationism.Mark Johnston - 1993 - In John Haldane & Crispin Wright (eds.), Reality, representation, and projection. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 85--130.

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