Why It Is Not Unreasonable to Fear Terrorism

Journal of Applied Philosophy 41 (3):409-422 (2024)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

A common view has it that since we are far likelier to be killed in some road or household accident than in a terror attack, our fear of the latter is exaggerated. I argue that terrorism's relatively limited death toll need not mean that fearing it is unreasonable, nor does it immediately imply that counter-terrorism policies are unjustified – whatever other, legitimate concerns these policies give rise to. First, I argue that in the special case of terrorism, it is misleading to focus on risk per capita, as critics typically do. Second, while terrorism has a probabilistic component which should be relevant to decision-making, risk is not entirely or even primarily what terrorism is all about. Third, I argue that fearing terrorism may be reasonable even while recognizing the small probability of personal harm. Due to terrorism's random character, the belief that one will escape harm rests on little more than statistical evidence. As I explain, this leaves some room for reasonable doubt, and a justified level of fear.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 100,752

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

A Straightforward Analysis of Terrorism.Joshua Glasgow - 2011 - Public Affairs Quarterly 25 (3):181-196.
Terrorism as a toxic term: why definition matters.Vicente Medina - 2019 - Government Europa Quarterly (30):160-162.
Terrorism and Collective Responsibility.Seumas Miller - 2004 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 18 (2):263-281.
Justifying Terrorism.Thom Brooks - 2010 - Public Affairs Quarterly 24 (3):189-196.
Terrorism and war.Virginia Held - 2004 - The Journal of Ethics 8 (1):59-75.
Defining Terrorism.Scott C. Lowe - 2006 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 2:253-256.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-08-29

Downloads
31 (#724,843)

6 months
6 (#851,135)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The View from Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 43 (2):399-403.
The lottery paradox, knowledge, and rationality.Dana K. Nelkin - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (3):373-409.
Contractualism and Social Risk.Johann Frick - 2015 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 43 (3):175-223.
Risking and Wronging.Rahul Kumar - 2015 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 43 (1):27-51.

View all 13 references / Add more references