The Problem of Irrelevant Conjunction — Revisited

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Abstract

E confirmsi H1 more strongly than E confirmsi H2 iff c(H1, E) > c(H2, E). [where c is some relevance measure]

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Author Profiles

Branden Fitelson
Northeastern University
James Hawthorne
University of Oklahoma

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