- New
-
Topics
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- Journals
- Submit material
- More
“Can do” attitudes: Some positive illusions are not misbeliefs
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):519 - 520 (2009)
Abstract
McKay & Dennett (M&D) argue that positive illusions are a plausible candidate for a class of evolutionarily misbeliefs. I argue (Flanagan 1991; 2007) that the class of alleged positive illusions is a hodge-podge, and that some of its members are best understood as positive attitudes, hopes, and the like, not as beliefs at allAuthor's Profile
Other Versions
No versions found
My notes
Similar books and articles
Adaptive misbeliefs are pervasive, but the case for positive illusions is weak.David Sloan Wilson & Steven Jay Lynn - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):539-540.
Benign folie à deux: The social construction of positive illusions.Dennis L. Krebs & Kathy Denton - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):525 - 526.
Adaptive misbeliefs and false memories.John Sutton, Ryan T. McKay & Daniel C. Dennett - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):535-536.
Misbelief and the neglect of environmental context.David Dunning - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):517-518.
The (mis) management of agency: Conscious belief and nonconscious self-control.Brandon Randolph-Seng - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):532 - 533.
Why we don't need built-in misbeliefs.Carol S. Dweck - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):518-519.
Adaptive misbelief or judicious pragmatic acceptance?Keith Frankish - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):520.
A positive illusion about “positive illusions”?Vladimir J. Konečni - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):524 - 525.
It is likely misbelief never has a function.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):529-530.
Are delusions biologically adaptive? Salvaging the doxastic shear pin.Aaron L. Mishara & Phil Corlett - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):530–531.
Analytics
Added to PP
2013-10-27
Downloads
40 (#561,410)
6 months
15 (#206,160)
2013-10-27
Downloads
40 (#561,410)
6 months
15 (#206,160)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
Citations of this work
Epistemic Reasons, Transparency, and Evolutionary Debunking.Nicole Dular & Nikki Fortier - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (4):1455-1473.
The Ethics of Belief in Student Ability.Jeff Standley - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 53 (1):61-76.
Science and the Modest Image of Epistemology.Owen Flanagan & Stephen Martin - 2012 - Human.Mente - Journal of Philosophical Studies 21.
References found in this work
Varieties of Moral Personality: Ethics and Psychological Realism.Owen Flanagan - 1991 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Nicomachean Ethics.Martin Aristotle & Ostwald - 1911 - New York: Hackett Publishing Company. Edited by C. C. W. Taylor.
Is there a universal need for positive self-regard?Steven H. Heine, Darrin R. Lehman, Hazel Rose Markus & Shinobu Kitayama - 1999 - Psychological Review 106 (4):766-794.
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-667477cd97-9l5tj dc2