Metaethical angst and the solace of sentimentalism

Philosophical Forum 55 (3):323-333 (2024)
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Abstract

Perhaps, nothing matters. Life might be devoid of value and meaning. Such thoughts can prompt feelings of angst. What kind of philosophical view could provide us with comfort? Some moral realists think that moral realism can. Moral realism does not comfort me. I think the comfort it gives others is an illusion. If we are moral realists, moral facts may be forever beyond our grasp. However, if we are anti-realist sentimentalists, then moral facts are built for us to find. If we want to avoid angst, we can find solace in sentimentalism. That is not a reason to think sentimentalism is true. However, it is a reason to prefer that it is true.

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