Interpretation Under Oppression: Charity is Not Enough

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics (forthcoming)
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Abstract

According to the Principle of Charity, we ought to interpret each other charitably. That is, we ought to adopt the interpretation that shows the interpreted person in the best light. The Principle of Charity is motivated by appealing to a harm asymmetry: it is worse (the thought goes) to mistakenly criticize someone than to fail to rightfully criticize them. This chapter argues that in oppressive contexts, charity is not enough. First, the Principle of Charity is myopic. Charitable interpretation only considers harm to the person being interpreted and ignores third party harms. Second, under conditions of oppression, our conceptual resources and evidential standards will be systematically biased against marginalized perspectives. So charitable interpretations will overlook harm to marginalized persons. Finally, the chapter give a diagnosis of the Principle of Charity: It misunderstands the interpersonal interpretive aim. The interpersonal interpretive aim is to interpret one another in a way that accurately captures the normative features that are crucial to our interpersonal relationships. What we need is not a Principle of Charity, but an Aim of Justice. The chapter’s conclusion explains what an Aim of Justice would require of us, notably, empathetic engagement and intellectual humility.

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A. K. Flowerree
Texas Tech University

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