Abstract

I argue first that it is a mistake to identify Hegel's fully developed theory of punishment with the theory of abstract retributivism often associated with him. Focusing on his Philosophy of Right, I show that for Hegel the normativity of a fully developed social institution is limited by social conflict and by the necessity of subjective attunement within the social institution. I argue further that consciousness of these aspects is essential to the actualization of the individual's freedom within the social order. And for that reason I conclude that such aspects limit any claims about the objective rationality of social institutions often attributed to Hegel. For instance, in the case of punishment the rationality of retribution cannot be established by an abstract rule proving the conceptual necessity of punishment. It requires instead the attuned dispositions of the parties in question, an attunement that is itself compromised by the possibility of conflict within finite ethical institutions and which for that reason cannot be provided by the philosophical account