Moral Scepticism and Moral Knowledge [Book Review]

Review of Metaphysics 35 (3):589-590 (1982)
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Abstract

Renford Bambrough has written a provocative little book that attempts to defend "objectivity" in morals from attacks by critics whom he variously lables as "sceptics," subjectivists," and "relativists." He maintains that these philosophers have presented a misrepresentation--a caricature--of the nature of morality. They have been right in emphasizing a central role for feelings and emotions in morals, but wrong in concluding that this robs morality of objectivity.

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