Abstract

Drawing on the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Alberto G. Urquidez works to free the fly from the metaphorical bottle by shifting the terms of the debate away from attempts at describing a thing that is not real and toward a normative or prescriptive approach to racism, rather than race, that emphasizes how the concept ought to be defined, as well as deployed, for anti-racist ends. Urquidez refers to this normative pragmatic approach as ‘conventionalism’ and the overarching structure of Defining Racism: A Philosophical Analysis thus describes this position and then emphasizes its normative force. Here, I unpack Urquidez’s dual critique while also emphasizing my anxieties about a linguistic approach to race or racism, which might be framed as a variation of the is/ought problem insofar as it remains unclear to me how Alberto’s framework accounts for the transition from descriptive critique to normative anti-racist action.