Abstract

When we attend a dance performance we expect to see human beings performing various sorts of bodily movements. Movement is, uncontroversially, the primary medium of a dance. Our intuition, then, is to think that our response to and understanding of the dance must be connected in some way to this movement. Attempts to relate our understanding of a dance, specifically our grasping the meaning of a dance, to the medium of movement, through a movement-oriented response have taken the form of theories that rely on a notion of kinesthetic response or kinesthetic empathy. My intentions in this essay are to show that the intuition that our understanding of a dance is kinesthetically based is correct and that how the kinesthetic brings us to understand the dance is different from the earlier empathy theories, in a number of important ways. But I will also argue that current analytic strategies will not suffice and that the full defense of kinesthetic understanding, as I will call it, will require a different manner of explaining and understanding of the activities of human beings. My own analysis will draw on a number of resources, primarily the case study of Alexander Technique, a body therapy that seems to give us access to the kinesthetic organization of our activities and the philosophical work of a number of people, centrally Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who argues strongly for the role movement plays in constituting our world. I will show how kinesthetic understanding, given the historical trajectories permitted by tradition and the mechanics of the human body, can bring dancers, choreographers, and critics to a point of intersection where they can experience and talk about dance in terms of its kinesthetic basis, and that without this intersection the kind of meaning in movement I am discussing cannot take place. They will miss the preferred intersection unless they achieve kinesthetic understanding