An analytic view of delusion

Abstract

The present article proposes a logical account of delusions, which are regarded as conclusions resulting from fallacious arguments. This leads to distinguish between primary, secondary, ..., n-ary types of delusional arguments. Examples of delusional arguments leading to delusion of reference, delusion of influence, thought-broadcasting delusion and delusion of grandeur are described and then analyzed. This suggests finally a way susceptible of improving the efficiency of cognitive therapy for delusions.

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How We Know What Isn't So.Thomas Gilovich - 1993 - New York, NY, USA: Free Press.

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