Elements of dialectical contextualism

Abstract

In what follows, I strive to present the elements of a philosophical doctrine, which can be defined as dialectical contextualism. I proceed first to define the elements of this doctrine: dualities and polar contraries, the principle of dialectical indifference and the one-sidedness bias. I emphasize then the special importance of this doctrine in one specific field of meta-philosophy: the methodology for solving philosophical paradoxes. Finally, I describe several applications of this methodology on the following paradoxes: Hempel's paradox, the surprise examination paradox and the Doomsday Argument

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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Blindspots.Roy A. Sorensen - 1988 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Blindspots.Roy Sorensen - 1990 - Mind 99 (393):137-140.
Blindspots.Michael Levin - 1991 - Noûs 25 (3):389-392.
On a so-called paradox.W. V. Quine - 1953 - Mind 62 (245):65-67.

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