Vague expectation value loss

Philosophical Studies 127 (3):483 - 491 (2006)
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Abstract

Vague subjective probability may be modeled by means of a set of probability functions, so that the represented opinion has only a lower and upper bound. The standard rule of conditionalization can be straightforwardly adapted to this. But this combination has difficulties which, though well known in the technical literature, have not been given sufficient attention in probabilist or Bayesian epistemology. Specifically, updating on apparently irrelevant bits of news can be destructive of one’s explicitly prior expectations. Stability of vague subjective opinion appears to need a more complex model.

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Bas C. Van Fraassen
San Francisco State University

Citations of this work

A defense of imprecise credences in inference and decision making.James Joyce - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):281-323.
Imprecise Probability and Higher Order Vagueness.Susanne Rinard - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):257-273.
Vague Credence.Aidan Lyon - 2017 - Synthese 194 (10):3931-3954.

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References found in this work

On indeterminate probabilities.Isaac Levi - 1974 - Journal of Philosophy 71 (13):391-418.
On Indeterminate Probabilities.Isaac Levi - 1978 - Journal of Philosophy 71 (13):233--261.
Fine-grained opinion, probability, and the logic of full belief.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 24 (4):349-377.
Qualitative probability as an intensional logic.Peter Gärdenfors - 1975 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 4 (2):171 - 185.

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