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Is knowing a state of mind? The case against
In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford, GB: Oxford: Oxford University Press (2009)
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Citations of this work
The Priority of Intentional Action: From Developmental to Conceptual Priority.Yair Levy - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.
The neural and cognitive mechanisms of knowledge attribution: An EEG study.Adam Michael Bricker - 2020 - Cognition 203 (C):104412.
Options and Diachronic Tragedy.Brian Hedden - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):423-451.
On Putting Knowledge 'First'.Jonathan Ichikawa & C. S. I. Jenkins - 2017 - In J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin W. Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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