Abstract

A significant part of Kit Fine’s work in metaphysics assumes a very fine-grained individuation of propositions and facts. This article discusses how such fine distinctions lead to inconsistency in ways which are similar to the inconsistency of naive set comprehension. The case of constraints on individuation arising from a relation of metaphysical ground will be considered in particular. Fine has developed a view of sets in response to the inconsistency of naive set comprehension according to which sets are postulated, and so form a merely potential hierarchy. This article explores what an analogous potentialist response might look like in the case of finely distinguished propositions and facts, and applies the resulting view to the case of metaphysical grounding. A potentially problematic feature of the view is highlighted, which is that it is unclear how it might allow one to formulate in suitable generality the claim that grounding is a well-founded relation among possible propositions.