Abstract

This paper discusses what I call “biological individuation” in the works of Kant and Hegel. Biological individuation is what makes one organism numerically distinct from another. Following a common distinction in metaphysics today, I separate this discussion into what I call “epistemic” and “metaphysical biological individuation”. The former is how we distinguish one organism from another, and the latter is how one organism distinguishes itself from another. Metaphysicians today convincingly hold that epistemic individuation presupposes metaphysical individuation. I apply this to the case at hand. It is impossible for us to distinguish one organism from another if this organism has not already distinguished itself from another. However, this poses a problem for a standard reading of Kant’s regulative ideas: it does not allow us to provide a Kantian account of metaphysical biological individuation. This paper offers an alternative, Hegel-inspired reading of the same, one that solves this problem.