Frankfurt cases and overdetermination

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):pp. 341-369 (2009)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In traditional Frankfurt cases some conditions that make an outcome unavoidable fail to bring about that outcome. These are cases of causal preemption. I defend this interpretation of traditional Frankfurt cases, and its application to free will, against a dilemma raised by various libertarians. But I go on to argue that Frankfurt cases involving gen- uine causal overdetermination are even more effective at achieving the compatibilist’s purposes. Such cases avoid the “flicker of freedom” debate and better display the central disagreement with regard to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

    This entry is not archived by us. If you are the author and have permission from the publisher, we recommend that you archive it. Many publishers automatically grant permission to authors to archive pre-prints. By uploading a copy of your work, you will enable us to better index it, making it easier to find.

    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,810

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
332 (#86,122)

6 months
28 (#121,908)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Eric Funkhouser
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville

Citations of this work

A Closer Look at Trumping.Sara Bernstein - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (1):1-22.
Blocking Blockage.Ken Levy - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (2):565-583.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829-839.
Living Without Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2001 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Causation as influence.David Lewis - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):182-197.
Events and Their Names.Jonathan Bennett - 1988 - Oxford University Press UK.

View all 46 references / Add more references