Abstract

This dissertation attempts to present a comprehensive study of the interpretive theory of law offered by Ronald Dworkin. We examine Dworkin's criticism of legal positivism, particularly the model of rules formulated by H. L. A. Hart. Dworkin's argument includes both descriptive and evaluative aspects: legal argumentation and judicial decision-making typically employ standards other than rules, such as moral principles concerning justice and fairness. Because these principles are not extra-legal, Dworkin argues that the positivists' doctrine of judicial discretion is misconceived, since there are, on Dworkin's view, virtually no legal "gaps." At the same time, since the principles legitimately condition the application of discrete rules, every decision is essentially interpretive . ;Dworkin tells us that arguments of principle typically defend the political rights of an individual. The focus here is on the fundamental right : the abstract right to equal respect and concern. It is argued that the two aspects of the fundamental right tug Dworkin in different directions--a situation which weakens considerably the moral strength and cogency of his theory. Despite the fact that rights are conceived of and defined in anti-utilitarian terms, it appears that their ultimate justification in Dworkin's argument is itself utilitarian. ;We examine the analogy Dworkin draws between judicial interpretation of the law and literary interpretation. Of central concern in this discussion is the interaction between legislative "intention" and reader response. Dworkin presents a "constructive" hermeneutical approach, arguing against intentionalism. A number of difficulties are noted: the emphasis on constructed meaning seems to suggest interpretive subjectivism; also, the "protestant" activity of the interpreter appears to conflict with the public and communitarian nature of the law. ;Finally, the analogy between legal interpretation and literary criticism is briefly explored. It is suggested that much of Dworkin's program rests upon some fundamental confusions regarding language and meaning, authorship, efficacy, and interpretive impulse. Despite the apparent similarity, a judge confronting a written law is engaged in an enterprise which is fundamentally different from that of the literary critic