The Habitual Body-Subject: A Study in Descartes and the Biran - Bergson - Merleau-Ponty Lineage

Dissertation, State University of New York at Stony Brook (1992)
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Abstract

Mind/body distinction, mental vs. bodily habits, discontinuous time: these major postulates of Descartes' philosophy are mutually reinforcing, in ways the dissertation establishes. Yet Descartes also developed a sense of mind-body unity, of the fusion of mental and bodily habits, and of a continuous, cumulative and creative time. These 'minor' themes of Descartes' philosophy were taken up and progressively enriched by Maine de Biran, Henri Bergson, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Read as a philosophical lineage, these later thinkers conceived of a 'body-subject' that, by virtue of the personal and social habits it acquires and modifies, is able to responsibly engage in traditions it continues, renews, and overturns

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