Abstract

In his Struggle for Recognition, Axel Honneth takes up in positive terms the System of Ethical Life written by Hegel in Jena 1802 with the aim of claiming the promising path of intersubjective recognition of individuals’ identity in order to describe the internal structure of primitive ethical relationships, which he places at the origin of the human socialisation process. However, in our opinion, such a founding situation does not exist. Indeed, intersubjectivity takes place in relation to a sphere of given meaning already established in a determined time and space, where the sense of the world precedes any individual constitution of meaning. Hence, the importance of context in which all sense giving takes place. The purpose of this article is therefore to criticise the theory of intersubjective recognition presented by Axel Honneth and to show the need for an objective mediation on the intersubjective constitution of identity, namely, a context that makes recognition possible.