Deep Brain Stimulation, Self and Relational Autonomy

Neuroethics 14 (1):31-43 (2018)
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Abstract

Questions about the nature of self and self-consciousness are closely aligned with questions about the nature of autonomy. These concepts have deep roots in traditional philosophical discussions that concern metaphysics, epistemology and ethics. They also have direct relevance to practical considerations about informed consent in medical contexts. In this paper, with reference to understanding specific side effects of deep brain stimulation treatment in cases of, for example, Parkinson’s Disease, Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, and Major Depressive Disorder, I’ll argue that it is best to frame discussions of informed consent in terms of relational autonomy and a pattern theory of self.

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Situating the self: understanding the effects of deep brain stimulation.Roy Dings & Leon de Bruin - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (2):151-165.

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Shaun Gallagher
University of Memphis

References found in this work

Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity.Charles Taylor - 1989 - Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press.
Consciousness Explained.Daniel Dennett - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):905-910.

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