El razonamiento sofístico (privado) y la teoría de los predicables

Tópicos: Revista de Filosofía 17 (1):33-69 (1999)
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Abstract

La doctrina aristotélica de las falacias en las Refutaciones Sofísticas no puede entenderse sin referirse a los Tópicos. En este artículo intentamos mostrar que, en esta última obra, hay una “lógica de los predicables” implícita, que podría explicar de manera muy convincente algunas de esas falacias, tales como la de accidente, de consecuente, secundum quid ad simpliciter y el balbuceo. Al mismo tiempo, presentamos los ingredientes principales de esta lógica y discutimos algunas soluciones modernas a estos sofismas.

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