Doing Bourgeois Philosophy at the End of History: Richard Rorty on Philosophy, Politics and Persuasion.
Dissertation, Northwestern University (
1992)
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Abstract
Have we finally reached the "end of philosophy", or even, the "end of history"? Do our contemporary Western, liberal-democratic societies represent "the last conceptual revolution" in politics, and "the end point of mankind's ideological evolution"? ;This dissertation attempts to explore these questions by critiquing Richard Rorty's philosophical and political writings. Rorty argues that Western, liberal democracies should put aside "theoretical" questions in the realm of political philosophy, and turn the task of improving our society over to novelists, ethnographers, television writers, and journalists. My examination of Rorty's vision for society proceeds as follows: ;First, I provide a very brief historical sketch of Rorty's life, and a somewhat more in depth discussion of his early philosophical project up to the publication of his first book, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature . ;Second, I undertake a detailed analysis and critique of Rorty's political philosophy, as he has developed it in articles since 1979 and in his latest book, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity . From this analysis I conclude that Rorty's vision is logically inconsistent. ;But that critique would not upset Rorty. So, I attempt, third, to redescribe Rorty's political vision, in an effort to show what kind of citizens would populate his "ideal society." I show that these citizens would bear a striking resemblance to James Thurber's fictional character, Walter Mitty. ;I argue, fourth, that to see Walter Mitty as an ideal citizen, one must believe that we have reached "the end of history." That phrase is used by Francis Fukuyama in 1989 to describe the historical import of the events of that year. I argue that Rorty also agrees with Fukuyama's thesis, and that both individuals are wrong. ;Finally, I conclude by arguing that Rorty's contention that democratic societies are simply those which substitute "persuasion for force" represents his most valuable insight. But I critique this insight by pointing out that Rorty can give us no indication of how we should differentiate persuasion from force