Alexander of Aphrodisias on syllogistic reasoning

Schole 13 (1):32-47 (2019)
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Abstract

The article deals with ancient ideas on the nature of syllogistics on the example of Empire's official Peripatetic philosopher, Alexander of Aphrodisias. We interpret Alexander's position on the syllogistic form as a theory of constant function. Alexander offers a conjunctive and purely formal understanding of the nature of syllogistic necessity. This approach to the modal properties of assertoric judgments differs from Theophrastus’ ontological position, who believed that modal characteristics of assertoric premises are determined by looking to the state-of-affairs to which they refer. Also, the paper examines Theophrastus’ legacy of hypothetical syllogisms related to Alexander. Stoic and Peripatetic versions are also compared against the background of Alexander's logical amalgamation. The article elucidates late “Peripatetic conservatism” regarding the hypothetical syllogistics.

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