A pragmatic approach to explanations

Philosophy of Science 47 (3):404-423 (1980)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

It is argued that it is not sufficient to consider only the sentences included in the explanans and explanandum when determining whether they constitute an explanation, but these sentences must always be evaluated relative to a knowledge situation. The central criterion on an explanation is that the explanans in a non-trivial way increases the belief value of the explanandum, where the belief value of a sentence is determined from the given knowledge situation. The outlined theory of explanations is applied to some well-known examples and is also compared to other theories of explanation

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 103,401

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The structure of physical explanation.John Forge - 1980 - Philosophy of Science 47 (2):203-226.
Models of intentional explanation.Robrecht Vanderbeeken - 2004 - Philosophical Explorations 7 (3):233 – 246.
Approximative Explanation.T. R. Girill - 1978 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1978:186 - 196.
Statistical Explanations.James H. Fetzer - 1972 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1972:337 - 347.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
86 (#251,873)

6 months
4 (#864,415)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Peter Gärdenfors
Lund University

References found in this work

Relevance and redundancy in deductive explanations.Peter Gärdenfors - 1976 - Philosophy of Science 43 (3):420-431.
Hempel’s Ambiguity.J. Alberto Coffa - 1974 - Synthese 28 (2):141 - 163.
On the logic of relevance.Peter Gärdenfors - 1978 - Synthese 37 (3):351 - 367.

View all 8 references / Add more references