Davidson on causal relevance

Ratio 12 (1):14-33 (1999)
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Abstract

Davidson argues that mental properties are causally relevant properties. I argue that Davidson cannot appeal to ceteris paribus causal laws to ensure that these properties are causally relevant, if he wishes to retain his argument for anomalous monism. Second, I argue that the appeal to supervenience cannot, by itself, give us an account of the causal relevancy of mental properties. I argue that, while mental properties may indeed 'make a difference' to the causally efficacious properties of events, this is not sufficient to show that mental properties are causally relevant

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Brian Jonathan Garrett
Kwantlen Polytechnic University

Citations of this work

Mental Causation.David Robb & John Heil - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Defending non-epiphenomenal event dualism.Brian Jonathan Garrett - 2000 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):393-412.

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