Intending and Acting: Toward a Naturalized Action Theory [Book Review]

Review of Metaphysics 41 (2):375-376 (1987)
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Abstract

Myles Brand's rather audacious goal in his new book is nothing less than "to usher in the next... stage of philosophical action theory," which stage he understands as its "naturalization". Hence the subtitle. Naturalization will consist, he explains, in showing that action theory is "continuous with scientific theory", especially with cognitive science and motivational psychology. One familiar with Stich's view that one moves from "folk psychology" to cognitive science by eliminating such mentalistic concepts as belief might think one naturalizes action theory by eliminating from it such concepts as belief, desire, motive, and intention. This, however, is not Brand's game. He thinks that "an understanding of human action depends on a scientific reading of intention". While he thinks that the cognitive psychology he discusses in chapters 7 and 8 has advanced our comprehension of what he calls the "cognitive component" in intention, the motivational psychology discussed in chapter 9 is in such "disarray" today that "there is presently no tenable scientific theory into which" what he calls the "conative component" of intention "can be transformed". These last three chapters range widely through the scientific literature on ideo-motor, program, script, drive, and expectancy theories. This discussion is detailed, technical, and sensitive to philosophical problems raised by the psychologists' claims and assumptions. Rare will be the philosopher who is not humbled, impressed, and informed by Brand's evident command and cogent critique of this material. Whether this work is of much philosophical value, I cannot say, but Brand is to be commended for taking "conceptual [philosophical] psychology [to be] the common base of scientific and folk psychology" and for holding that "a scientific psychological model is adequate only if it is compatible with the [philosophically] transformed conceptual claims of folk psychology". After Rorty, it takes courage to call both folk and scientific psychology before the bar of philosophy.

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Jhoan garcia
Universidad del Valle

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