Abstract

The paper discusses four main views on the relation between language and reasons. Two of them contend that there is no significant relation, on different bases; a third contends that linguistic features can only be clarified by relating them to motivating reasons, and the fourth makes a similar claim but with respect to normative reasons instead. These approaches assume contrasting views on the nature of language. The first is a Platonist view on which the languages are abstract entities whose properties are independent of the psychology of rational beings. The second, promoted by Chomsky’s very successful research programs, sees languages as a feature of the nonconscious deep psychology of human beings, a genetically determined subpersonal part of the mind/brain. The third has two different guises: the Davidsonian interpretationist perspective, and Gricean proposals. The fourth holds that languages constitute speech-act potentials, on the assumption that speech-acts provide speakers with normative reasons.