Abstract

Problems in understanding other minds cluster around issues of commonality of, and issues of differences in, beliefs and values with two traditional competing doctrines: relativism and ethnocentrism. Philosophers fascinated with differences advocate relativism in order to make sense of the experiences of other minds while those interested in commonality usually advocate ethnocentrism in order to account for these experiences. ;This is how and why we have grown accustomed to thinking that talk of differences commits one to relativism whereas talk of commonality is likely to bind one to ethnocentric assumptions. Drawing upon Donald Davidson's theory of radical interpretation, I argue against this traditional picture by pointing out how Davidson's theory, properly understood, introduces us to a sea change about knowledge of other minds. ;I show that Davidson's theory reveals that we can intelligibly talk about differences without being committed to relativism and that we can satisfactorily talk about commonality without lending ourselves to ethnocentrism. I also argue for the fact that this theory deprives relativism of explanatory power with respect to explication of differences in beliefs and values. Furthermore, I indicate the extent to which, contrary to the traditional assumptions, relativism shares with ethnocentrism the imperialistic predicament which philosophers take pains to avoid. ;These consequences of my interpretation of Davidson's epistemology are better grasped and appreciated when that epistemology is both seen in the mirror of a process of triangulation, i.e., a three-way relation between a speaker, an interpreter, and an object or event in the physical world, and contrasted with Benjamin Whorf's defense of relativism and Richard Rorty's apology for ethnocentrism