Representationalism, peripheral awareness, and the transparency of experience

Philosophical Studies 139 (1):39-56 (2008)
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Abstract

It is often said that some kind of peripheral (or inattentional) conscious awareness accompanies our focal (attentional) consciousness. I agree that this is often the case, but clarity is needed on several fronts. In this paper, I lay out four distinct theses on peripheral awareness and show that three of them are true. However, I then argue that a fourth thesis, commonly associated with the so-called "self-representational approach to consciousness," is false. The claim here is that we have outer focal consciousness accompanied often (or even always) by inner peripheral (self-)awareness. My criticisms stem from both methodological and phenomenological considerations. In doing so, I offer a diagnosis as to why the fourth thesis has seemed true to so many and also show how the so-called "transparency of experience," frequently invoked by representationalists, is importantly relevant to my diagnosis. Finally, I respond to several objections and to further attempts to show that thesis four is true. What emerges is that if one wishes to hold that some form of self-awareness accompanies all outer-directed conscious states, one is better off holding that such self-awareness is itself unconscious, as is held for example by standard higher-order theories of consciousness.

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Rocco J. Gennaro
University of Southern Indiana

Citations of this work

Panpsychism and Neutral Monism}: How to Make Up One}’s Mind.Sam Coleman - 2017 - In Godehard Brüntrup & Ludwig Jaskolla, Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives. New York, NY: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 249--282.
Awareness without Time.Akiko Frischhut - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
Editorial: Consciousness and Inner Awareness.Jonathan Farrell & Tom McClelland - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1):1-22.

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References found in this work

A Materialist Theory of the Mind.D. M. Armstrong - 1968 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Ted Honderich.
Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Critique of Pure Reason.I. Kant - 1787/1998 - Philosophy 59 (230):555-557.

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