Minds, Machines and Godel

Philosophy 37 (139):62-63 (1962)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I Would like to draw attention to the basic defect in the argument used by Mr J. R. Lucas.Mr Lucas there states that Gödel's theorem shows that any consistent formal system strong enough to produce arithmetic fails to prove, within its own structure, theorems that we, as humans, can nevertheless see to be true. From this he argues that ‘minds’ can do more than machines, since machines are essentially formal systems of this same type, and subject to the limitation implied by Godel's theorem.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 100,809

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-02-21

Downloads
23 (#937,234)

6 months
8 (#575,465)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Minds vs Machines.Karim Gherab - 2022 - Human Review. International Humanities Review / Revista Internacional de Humanidades 11 (2):185-195.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references