Abstract

Claude Lefort’s theory of democratic indeterminacy has been an influential source among democratic theorists to demonstrate that democratic times lack absolute and determinate grounds on which to base and justify collectivities in the name of society or the people. However, few readers have paid sustained attention to Lefort’s advice that we should read Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological move from the idea of “body” to “flesh” to grasp the experience of indeterminacy. This article attends to this advice, and excavates how Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological discussion of indeterminacy guides Lefort’s idea of democratic indeterminacy. More importantly, however, the article reveals that Lefort’s appropriation of Merleau-Ponty’s concept of flesh signals an ambiguity in Lefort’s democratic theory—an ambiguity that presents democratic indeterminacy either as the radical possibility of creating democratic collectivities, or as the impossibility of decisively achieving democratic collectivities. Challenging Lefort’s subject-centered interpretation of flesh, the article contends that Merleau-Ponty’s move from body to flesh is to emphasize indeterminacy as an intersubjective, worldly experience. This world-centered reading of flesh suggests that the promise of democratic indeterminacy lies not only in questioning the closure of collectivities but also in proliferating collective experiences in many areas of common life.