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Putting particularism in its place
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):312-324 (2008)
Abstract
Abstract: The point of this paper is to undermine the support that particularism in the domain of epistemic reasons might seem to give to particularism in the domain of practical reasons. In the epistemic domain, there are two related notions: truth and the rationality of belief. Epistemic reasons are related to the rationality of belief, and not directly to truth. In the domain of practical reasons, however, the role of truth is taken by the notion of objective rationality. Practical reasons are directly relevant to this objective notion, and therefore the reasons to expect holism and particularism in the epistemic domain do not transfer to the domain of practical rationality.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
What makes reasons sufficient?Mark Schroeder - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (2):159-170.
Can the Canberrans’ Supervenience Argument Refute Shapeless Moral Particularism?Peter Shiu-Hwa Tsu - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (3):545-560.
References found in this work
Wise choices, apt feelings: a theory of normative judgment.Allan Gibbard - 1990 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
A theory of justice.John Rawls - 2009 - In Steven M. Cahn, Exploring ethics: an introductory anthology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 133-135.
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