Abstract

A. Knowledge and universal The points about the relationship between knowledge and universal in Aristotle’s philosophy can be inferred as such: 1. Knowledge of a universal includes knowledge of all its subordinates (τὰ ὑποκείμενα) in a sense. (Met., A, 982a21-23) The converse of this is not true because ‘highest universals (τὰ πρῶτα) and causes are not known by things subordinate to them (τῶν ὑποκειμένων). (Met., A, 982b2-4) 2. Knowledge is bound up severely with universality: ‘For all things that we know, we know in so far as they have some unity and identity, and in so far as some attribute belongs to them universally.’ (Met., B, 999a28-29) Aristotle believes that ‘the knowledge of anything is universal.’ (Met, B, 1003a13-15) It is for this reason that Aristotle argues that ‘if there is to be knowledge of principles there must be other principles prior to them, which are universally predicated of them.’ (Met, B, 1003a15-17) 3. About the relationship between the knowledge of a universal and the knowledge of its subordinate particulars we have the following: a) Knowledge of universal and particular are alongside each other: ‘It never happens that a man starts with a foreknowledge of the particular, but along with the process of being led to see the general principle he receives a knowledge of the particulars, by an act (as it were) of recognition.’ (PrA., B, 21, 67a22-26) b) ‘By a knowledge of the universal then we see the particulars.’ Thus, while we have the knowledge of the universal, we might ‘make a mistake in apprehending the particulars.’ (PrA., B, 21, 67a27-31) ‘It is when it meets with the particular object that it knows in a manner the particular through its knowledge of the universal.’ (Phy., Z, 3) c) ‘Knowing the universal without knowing the individual included in this, will often fail to cure.’ (Met., A, 981a21-23) 4. Most exact sciences are those dealing with highest genera. (τῶν πρώτων) (Met., A, 982a25-26) Also, those involving fewer universals are more exact than those involving additional ones. (Met., A, 982a26-28) 5. The role of universals totally differs based on the method by which we are to acquire knowledge. If we are to acquire the knowledge of a thing by examining its parts, its principles would not be its genera. (Met., B, 998a32-b4) ‘But in so far as we know each thing by its definition, and the genera are the principles of definition, the genera must also be the principles of definable things.’ (Met., B, 998b4-6) Those two ways are inconsistent and ‘it is not possible to describe the principles in both ways because the formula of the substance is one but definition by genera will be different from that which states the constituent parts of a thing.’ (Met., B, 998b11-14) 6. Aristotle projects an aporia about the role of universals in knowledge: ‘Even if the genera are in the highest degree principles, should one regard the first of the genera as principle, or those which are predicated directly of the individual?’ (Met., B, 998b14-16) On the other hand, ‘if the universal is always more of a principle, evidently the uppermost of the genera (τὰ ἀνωτάτων τῶν γενῶν) are the principles.’ (Met., B, 998b17-19) But the problem is that there will be as many principles of things as there are primary genera. (Met., B, 998b19-21) But if, on the other hand, principles are not universal, they cannot be knowable because the knowledge of anything is universal. (Met., B, 1003a13-15) 7. ‘We know no sensible thing, once it has passed beyond the range of our senses, … except by means of the universal and the possession of the knowledge which is proper to the particular, but without the actual exercise of that knowledge.’ (PrA., B, 21, 67a39-b3) Therefore, knowledge of a particular, even when we do not sense it at the moment, is possible only through universal and, as Aristotle notes, ‘this is the relation of knowledge of the universal to knowledge of the particular.’ (PrA., B, 21, 67a38-39) 8. Those that are more universal (τὰ μάλιςτα καθόλου) are hardest to know because they are furthest from the senses. (Met., Α, 982a23-25) 9. Since in every demonstration, ‘besides axioms and conclusion, there is a third element, namely ‘the subject-genus (τὸ γένος τὸ ὑποκείμμενον) whose attributes, i.e. essential properties, are revealed by the demonstration,’ it is not possible to pass from one genus to another in demonstration. Thus, we cannot e.g. prove geometrical truths by arithmetic. (PsA., A, 7, 75a38-b3) 10. Aristotle regards ‘knowledge of the universal’ as only one sense among three senses of knowledge. The other two senses are i) to have knowledge proper to the matter in hand and ii) to exercise such knowledge. (PrA., B, 67b3-11) B. Knowledge and syllogism The following points are asserted by Aristotle about the relation of knowledge and syllogism: 1. Knowing premisses does not necessarily lead to the knowledge of conclusion. What makes the conclusion necessary is the consideration of the propositions together: ‘Nothing prevents a man who knows both that A belongs to the whole of B, and that B again belongs to C, thinking that A does not belong to C … for he does not know that A belongs to C, unless he considers the two propositions together,’ (PrA., B, 21, 67a31-38) 2. Aristotle asserts that when a syllogism is knowledge-giver (ἐπιστημονικόν), it is a demonstration and defines knowledge-giver as that ‘having it as being is the same as knowing it (ἐπιστημονικὸν δὲ λέγω καθ᾽ ὃν τῷ ἔχειν αὐτὸν ἐπιστάμεθα).’ (PsA., A, 2, 71b17-19) 3. Albeit he accepts the fact that there may be another manner of knowing, Aristotle is inclined to base knowledge on demonstration. (PsA., A, 2, 71b16-17) 4. What generates the reasoned knowledge of the conclusion is the necessary connection of the middle with both of the extremes: ‘If, then, we suppose a syllogism in which, though A necessarily inheres in C, yet B, the middle term of the demonstration, is not necessarily connected with A and C, then the man who argues thus has no reasoned knowledge of the conclusion, since this conclusion does not owe its necessity to the middle term: for though the conclusion is necessary, the mediating link is a contingent fact.’ (PsA., A, 6, 74b) 5. Aristotle distinguishes between two different kinds of knowledge acquired out of syllogism: knowledge of the fact (τὸ δ᾽ ὃτι ἐπίστασθαι) versus knowledge of the reasoned fact (τὸ διότι ἐπίστασθαι). He makes the same distinction between opinion of the fact and opinion of the reasoned fact. Their main difference is that the latter can only be obtained through immediate premises. (PsA., A, 33, 89a20-23) Aristotle does not fully explain the difference. However, it seems there are two conditions in which we have only a knowledge of the fact and not that of the reasoned fact: a) Having the proximate or strict cause is a necessary condition of knowledge of reasoned fact. Thus, when the proximate cause is not contained, that is, when the premises of the syllogism are not immediate, we have only knowledge of the fact. (PsA., A, 13, 78a23-26) Also, when the middle falls outside the extremes, the strict cause is not given and the demonstration is only of the fact and not of the reasoned fact. ‘Such cases are like far-fetched explanations which precisely consist in making the cause too remote.’ (PsA, A, 13, 78b11-30) b) When instead of the cause, the better known of the two reciprocals is taken as the middle. (PsA., A, 13, 78a26-30) Aristotle asserts that ‘the syllogism of the reasoned fact is either exclusively or generally speaking and in most cases’ in the first figure (PsA., A, 14, 79a17-20) and that the ‘grasp of a reasoned conclusion is the primary condition of knowledge.’ (PsA., A, 14, 79a20-21) 6. The most scientific figure and ‘the primary condition of knowledge’ (κυριώτατον τοῦ ἐπιστασθαι) (PsA., Α, 14, 79a31-32) is the first figure. Aristotle provides us two reasons for this (PsA., A, 14, 79a17-28): a) ‘The syllogism of the reasoned fact is either exclusively or generally speaking and in most cases’ in the first figure (PsA., A, 14, 79a17-20) b) It is the only figure which enables us to pursue knowledge of the essence of a thing. The reason is that the knowledge of a thing’s essence must be both affirmative and universal. The second figure has no affirmative conclusion possible and the third figure no universal conclusion. 7. The middle of a syllogism is the object of every inquiry. (PsA., B, 3, 90a35) This is obvious in cases in which the middle is sensible because the middle is what we have not perceived it. (PsA., B, 2, 90a24-30) 8. Neither demonstration nor definition provides us the knowledge of essence. (PsA., B, 7, 92b38-) 9. A necessary conclusion and, thus, a demonstrative knowledge, can be reached in a demonstration in which the relations of the extremes with the middle be a necessary relation. (PsA., A, 6, 75a12-15) 10. Though a syllogism can be dependent on another, syllogisms must eventually be based on premises not concluded out of a syllogism. Thus, we must have some knowledge that we have not acquired through syllogism. The scientific knowledge then that is acquired in syllogism must be dependent on a knowledge not scientifically provided. However, this knowledge cannot be less accurate than scientific knowledge because otherwise our knowledge could not be scientific: ‘There will be no scientific knowledge of the primary premisses, and since except intuition nothing can be truer than scientific knowledge, it will be intuition that apprehends the primary premisses- a result which also follows from the fact that demonstration cannot be the originative source of demonstration, nor, consequently, scientific knowledge of scientific knowledge. If, therefore, it is the only other kind of true thinking except scientific knowing, intuition will be the originative source of scientific knowledge. And the originative source of science grasps the original basis premiss, while science as a whole is similarly related as originative source to the whole body of fact.’ (PsA., B, 19, 100b8-17) C. Knowledge and necessity It is an essential difference between knowledge and opinion for Aristotle that while the truth grasped by the latter can be other than it is, that of the former cannot. (PsA., A, 33, 89a16-20) ‘The proper object of unqualified scientific knowledge is something which cannot be other than it is.’ (PsA., A, 2, 71b15-16) A necessary conclusion and, thus, a demonstrative knowledge, can be reached in a demonstration in which the relations of the extremes with the middle be a necessary relation. (PsA., A, 6, 75a12-15) Even a necessary conclusion, if it does not owe its necessity to the middle term, would not provide reasoned knowledge. (PsA., A, 74b) D. Pre-existent knowledge ‘All instruction given or received by way of argument proceeds from pre-existent knowledge.’ Aristotle proves this by enumerating all the kinds of such instructions: mathematical sciences, all other speculative sciences, the two forms of dialectical reasoning, i.e. syllogism (in its premisses) and induction (exhibiting the universal as implicit in the clearly known particular) and even rhetorical arguments including example (which is a kind of induction) and enthymeme (which is a kind of syllogism). (PsA., A, 1, 71a1-11) Moreover, besides previous knowledge, recognition of truth may contain also ‘knowledge acquired simultaneously’ with that recognition. Thus, while we already have virtually known a particular actually falling under the universal, we know it only in a manner but do not know it in another manner. (PsA., A, 1, 71a17-26) The possibility of knowing something in a manner and at the same time not knowing it in another manner is Aristotle’s alternative for Plato’s theory of recollection as a solution of Meno’s problem. (cf. PsA, A, 1, 71a26-29) E. Property of knowledge Since ‘we form a property for the sake of knowledge,’ the terms in which the property rendered must be more familiar. So we can conceive the subject of the property more adequately. (To., E, 2, ^129b7-) F. Knowledge: from whole to part ‘What is to us plain and obvious at first is rather confused masses, the elements and principles of which become known to us later by analysis. Thus we must advance from generalities to particulars; for if it is a whole that is best known to sense perception, and a generality is a kind of whole, corresponding many things within it, like parts. Much the same thing happens in the relation of the name to the formula. A name, e.g. ‘round,’ means vaguely a sort of whole: its definition analyses this into its particular senses. Similarly, a child begins by calling all men ‘father,’ and all women ‘mother,’ but later on distinguishing each of them. (Phy., A, 1) G. Knowledge and element ‘When the objects of an inquiry, in any department, have principles, conditions, or elements, it is through acquaintance with these that knowledge, that is to say scientific knowledge, is attained.’ (Phy., A, 1) It is through going from masses to elements, i.e. through analyzing each thing to its elements that we get knowledge: ‘What is plain to us and obvious at first is rather confused masses, the elements and principles of which become known to us later by analysis. Thus we must advance from generalities to particulars; for it is a whole that is best known to sense-perception, and a generality is a kind of whole, comprehending many things within it, like parts. Much the same thing happens in the relation of the name to the formula. A name, e.g. ‘round,’ means vaguely a sort of whole: its definition analyses this into its particular senses. Similarly, a child begins by calling all men ‘father’ and all women ‘mother,’ but later on distinguishing each of them.’ (Phy., A, 1)