Partial belief as a solution to the logical problem of holding simultaneous, contrary beliefs in self-deception research

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):115-116 (1997)
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Abstract

A major worry in self-deception research has been the implication that people can hold a belief that something is true and false at the same time: a logical as well as a psychological impossibility. However, if beliefs are held with imperfect confidence, voluntary self-deception in the sense of seeking evidence to reject an unpleasant belief becomes entirely plausible and demonstrably real.

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