Evidentialism about Faith and the Justification Encroachment Dilemma

Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (1):62-66 (2022)
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Abstract

In this paper, I develop what I call the Justification Encroachment (JE) Dilemma for Dormandy’s Evidentialism about Faith (EaF). The dilemma is this. If JE is true, then belief about objects of faith will be very difficult to justify, perhaps even impossible. If JE is false, then beliefs about objects of faith require no greater justification than any other belief, so that faith requires no more respect for evidence than anything else. After developing each horn, I consider very briefly how a proponent of EaF might respond.

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Alex R Gillham
St. Bonaventure University

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References found in this work

Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Evidentialism.Richard Feldman & Earl Conee - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (1):15 - 34.
Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2006 - Critica 38 (114):98-107.

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