- New
-
Topics
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- Journals
- Submit material
- More
Social Rules: Some Problems for Hart’s Account, and an Alternative Proposal [Book Review]
Law and Philosophy 18 (2):141-171 (1999)
Abstract
What is a social rule? This paper first notes three important problems for H.L.A. Hart's famous answer in the Concept of Law. An alternative account that avoids the problems is then sketched. It is less individualistic than Hart's and related accounts. This alternative account can explain a phenomenon observed but downplayed by Hart: the parties to a social rule feel that they are in some sense 'bound' to conform to it.Author's Profile
Other Versions
No versions found
Links
PhilArchive
External links
(no proxy)
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Through your library
- Sign in / register and customize your OpenURL resolver
- Configure custom resolver
My notes
Similar books and articles
The Methodology of Legal Philosophy.Alex Langlinais & Brian Leiter - 2016 - In Herman Cappelen, Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
Is the Rule of Recognition Really a Conventional Rule?Julie Dickson - 2007 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 27 (3):373-402.
The Social Basis of Ultimate Legal Rules: Hayek Meets Hart.Mikołaj Barczentewicz - 2018 - In Peter J. Boettke, Virgil Henry Storr & Jayme Lemke (eds.), Exploring the Political Economy and Social Philosophy of F. A. Hayek. Rowman & Littlefield International.
Perspectives in Jurisprudence: An Analysis of H. L. A. Hart's Legal Theory.Eric Joseph Boos - 1996 - Dissertation, Marquette University
Kelsen, Quietism, and the Rule of Recognition.Michael Steven Green - 2008 - In Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth E. Himma (eds.), THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. Oxford University Press.
Hart on the role of justice in the concept of law: some further remarks.Petar Popović - 2022 - Jurisprudence 13 (4):489-515.
Analytics
Added to PP
2009-01-28
Downloads
127 (#172,994)
6 months
20 (#148,864)
2009-01-28
Downloads
127 (#172,994)
6 months
20 (#148,864)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
Citations of this work
A New Conventionalist Theory of Promising.Erin Taylor - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):667-682.
Social Norms and Obligation: Rescuing the Joint Commitment Account.Titus Stahl - 2024 - Analyse & Kritik 46 (1):67-83.
An argument against the social fact thesis (and some additional preliminary steps towards a new conception of legal positivism).Kevin Toh - 2008 - Law and Philosophy 27 (5):445 - 504.
References found in this work
Walking Together: A Paradigmatic Social Phenomenon.Margaret Gilbert - 1990 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 15 (1):1-14.
Is an Agreement an Exchange of Promises?Margaret Gilbert - 1993 - Journal of Philosophy 90 (12):627-649.
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-667477cd97-9l5tj dc2