Explaining Moral Judgments as Conscious Phenomena

Sogang Journal of Philosophy 80:67-92 (2025)
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Abstract

This paper explores moral judgments as conscious phenomena, highlighting the necessity of an interdisciplinary approach to achieve a comprehensive scientific understanding. Integrating insights from neuroscience, moral psychology, and philosophy of science, it adopts a mechanistic framework to analyze moral judgments through three dimensions: informational diversity, functional dynamics, and intentionality. While the mechanistic approach provides a robust foundation for decomposing moral judgments into their constitutive elements, it faces limitations in establishing causal relationships across neural levels and integrating complex cognitive processes. To address these challenges, it evaluates neuroscientific theories of consciousness, identifying Global Workspace Theory (GWT) as the most suitable framework for unifying distributed neural processes into coherent conscious experiences. By synthesizing mechanistic philosophy with GWT, this paper offers a novel explanatory model for understanding moral judgments as multidimensional, integrative, and conscious phenomena.

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2025-03-02

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Jinyeong Gim
Seoul National University (PhD)

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