Legal Personhood and the Firm: Avoiding Anthropomorphism and Equivocation

Journal of Institutional Economics 12 (3):499-513. (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

From the legal point of view, "person" is not co-extensive with "human being." Nor is it synonymous with "rational being" or "responsible subject." Much of the confusion surrounding the issue of the firm’s legal personality is due to the tendency to address the matter with only these, all too often conflated, definitions of personhood in mind. On the contrary, when the term "person" is defined in line with its original meaning as "mask" worn in the legal drama, it is easy to see that it is only the capacity to attract legal relations that defines the legal person. This definition, that avoids the undesirable emotional associations and equivocations that often plague the debate, is important for a legally-grounded view of the firm.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-12-28

Downloads
1,744 (#8,276)

6 months
190 (#17,693)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

David Gindis
University of Warwick

References found in this work

Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829-839.
Conditions of personhood.Daniel C. Dennett - 1976 - In Amélie Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press.
The Idea of Human Rights.Charles R. Beitz - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
Institutions of law: an essay in legal theory.Neil MacCormick - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The problems of jurisprudence.Richard A. Posner - 1990 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

View all 24 references / Add more references