Viewpoint Diversity and Its Epistemic Benefits

Philosophy Compass 20 (3):e70021 (2025)
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Abstract

Groups are viewpoint diverse when their members think about the same problem in different ways. There exists a multi-disciplinary literature arguing that viewpoint diversity improves a group's epistemic outcomes. But within that literature, the concept of a viewpoint goes unanalyzed. This paper builds on work by the political philosopher Gerald Gaus to develop an analysis of a problem-specific viewpoint. It considers two cases where viewpoint diversity improves decision-making quality. In the first case, group members all share criteria for evaluating solutions to their problem, such that all agree on which solution is “best” when they find it. In the second case, group members do not share these criteria because the evaluation of solutions is essentially contestable. Although the existing evidence is not decisive, we have reason to believe that viewpoint diversity, when properly harnessed, improves epistemic outcomes in both cases.

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Adam Gjesdal
Chapman University

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