Generalism and the Metaphysics of Ontic Structural Realism

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (2):751-772 (2020)
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Abstract

Ontic structural realism claims that all there is to the world is structure. But how can this slogan be turned into a worked-out metaphysics? Here I consider one potential answer: a metaphysical framework known as ‘generalism’. According to the generalist, the most fundamental description of the world is not given in terms of individuals bearing properties, but rather, general facts about which states of affairs obtain. However, I contend that despite several apparent similarities between the positions, generalism is unable to capture the two main motivations for OSR. I suggest instead that OSR should be construed as a meta-metaphysical position. 1Introduction 2Motivations 2.1Theory change 2.2Permutation invariance 3Metaphysics 4Generalism 4.1Quantifier generalism 4.2Algebraic generalism 5Why Generalism Is Not Ontic Structural Realism 6Ontic Structural Realism as Meta-metaphysics 7Conclusion

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David Glick
University of California, Davis

References found in this work

A confutation of convergent realism.Larry Laudan - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (1):19-49.
Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized.James Ladyman & Don Ross - 2007 - In James Ladyman & Don Ross (eds.), Every thing must go: metaphysics naturalized. New York: Oxford University Press.
What is structural realism?James Ladyman - 1998 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 29 (3):409-424.
A Confutation of Convergent Realism.Larry Laudan - 2001 - In Yuri Balashov & Alexander Rosenberg (eds.), Philosophy of Science: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 211.

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